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WHAT WOULD COASE DO? (ABOUT PARKING
REGULATION)
Michael Lewyn*
INTRODUCTION

Externalities are "costs or benefits imposed on third parties by
another individual's voluntary action."' One of the leading early
"Law and Economics" theoreticians, Ronald Coase,2 has written that
government regulation may be necessary to protect individuals from
externalities; for example, regulations that protect neighboring
properties from the harm created by a factory's smoke.3

*Associate Professor, Touro School of Law. Wesleyan University, B.A; University
of Pennsylvania, J.D. I would like to thank Haynes Goddard, Andrew Green, Todd
Litman and Hannah Wiseman for their helpful comments. Any errors of law, fact
or logic are mine and not theirs.
1. Nicole L. Johnson, Comment, BlackBerry Users Unite! Expanding the
Consumer Class Action To Include a Class Defense, 116 YALE L.J. 217, 219 n.9
(2006) (citing Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory ofProperty Rights, 57 AM. EcoN.
REv. 347, 348 (1967)). See LEE FENNELL, THE UNBOUNDED HOME 46 (2009)
(defining externalities as "costs or benefits imposed or bestowed on others that an
actor does not take into account in deciding how to act").
2. See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Coase Theorem and Arthur Cecil Pigou, 51
ARIz. L. REv. 633, 633 (2009) (modern law and economics movement "originated"
with Coase).
3. R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 18 (1960)
(stating that government regulation might be appropriate in an example where a
factory creates smoke that has harmful effects on many neighboring properties). I
note that such externalities are not limited to physical harm to property. For
example, distortions in price may also cause harmful externalities. See Bruce C.
Greenwald & Joseph E. Stiglitz, 101 Q.J. ECON. 229, 229-30 (1986) (providing
where "one individual's or firm's actions affect another only through effects on
prices", such "pecuniary externalities" have significant harmful consequences); see
infra Part III.A.1 (suggesting that minimum parking requirements distort price of
parking and have such harmful consequences).
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Coase points out, however, that government regulation may create
its own externality-like harms, 4 noting that because the costs of
regulation "include all the consequences which follow from [such
regulation]... it will no doubt commonly be the case that the gain
which would come from regulating the actions which give rise to the
harmful effects will be less than the costs involved in Government
regulation." 5 In other words, government regulation is inappropriate
where the social harm caused by regulation outweighs the harm
prevented by such regulation.
This article analyzes one form of regulation that might fit into this
category: municipal minimum parking requirements. American
municipalities typically require landowners to provide visitors and
6
guests with ample amounts of parking. For example, Jacksonville,
Florida requires apartment complexes to provide 1.75 parking spaces
per one-bedroom apartment7 - despite the fact that sixteen percent of
Jacksonville's renter households do not even own one car.
Commercial landowners are subjected to similarly restrictive
regulations; for example, most American cities require office
buildings to provide four parking spaces per 1000 square feet of

4. Technically, the consequences of government action might not fit this
definition of "externalities," either because the government is not an "individual" or
because the government represents society as a whole and thus no citizen is a "third
party" in relation to government. See Samuel Staley, Comment to Externalities,
Meet Externalities, PLANETIZEN (Jul. 1, 2010, 10:59), http://www.planetizen.com
/node/44907#comment-13455.
5. Coase, supra note 3, at 18.
6. See Michael Lewyn & Shane Cralle, Planners Gone Wild: The
Overregulation of Parking, 33 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 613, 613 n. 1 (2007)
(asserting that minimum parking requirements are "virtually universal" in the
United States (citing DONALD C. SHOUP, THE HIGH COST OF FREE PARKING 22, 25

(2005))).

Cf Stuart Donavan & David Seymour, Parking Requirements Come

With a High Price, GUELPH MERCURY, July 7, 2009, available at 2009 WLNR

12980999.
7. See JACKSONVILLE, FLA., ORDINANCE CODE

§ 656.604(a)(2) (1990).

See

also Lewyn & Cralle, supra note 6, at 614 (citing other examples).
8. See AM. CMTY. SURV., UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, tbl. B25044,

Jacksonville city, Florida (2006-2008), http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet
/DTTable?_bm=y&-state=dt&-context-dt&-ds-name=ACS2008_3YR GOO_&mt name=ACS 2008 3YRG2000_B25044&-tree id=3308&caller-geoselect&-geo id=16000US1235000&-searchresults=01OOOUS&format-&-_lang=en (emphasis added).
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office space. 9 Because four parking spaces consume about 1200
square feet of space, 10 this means that a commercial landlord must
allocate the majority of its land to parking - land that could otherwise
have been used to create housing, shops, or offices.
This article begins by describing the externalities that minimum
parking requirements are designed to prevent - most notably the
congestion, pollution, and greenhouse gas emissions that occur when
motorists drive around a city searching for scarce parking, 1 as well
as neighborhood residents' loss of parking spaces to motorists who
wish to patronize nearby businesses. 12
This article suggests that minimum parking requirements may in
fact increase, rather than reduce, congestion, pollution and
greenhouse gas emissions, and thus create, rather than reduce, some
of the very harms they were enacted to prevent. This is the case for
several reasons. First, minimum parking requirements, by artificially
increasing the supply of parking, reduce the cost of parking and thus
force landowners to not only build parking lots, but also give parking
to motorists for free.13 Experiments involving priced parking show
that people drive more when parking is cheaper and drive less when
parking is not subsidized by employers. 14 For example, in one Los
Angeles-area workplace, an employer raised the price of parking for
solo drivers to two-thirds of the market rate.' 5 As a result, the
percentage of workers driving alone to work was halved.16 Because
commuters' transportation choices are at least somewhat pricesensitive, minimum parking requirements lead to more automobile
trips.
9. See SHOUP, supra note 6, at 31.
10. Id.
11. See infra Part II.A.
12. See infra Part II.B.
13. See infra Part III.A. 1. Or more precisely, free of any marginal charge for
parking itself, as opposed to the costs that are passed on to tenants and their
customers.
14. See infra notes 41-47.
15. See infra notes 45-46.
16. See infra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
17. And not just in the context of parking prices. Cf Thomas Merrill & David
M. Schizer, Energy Policyfor an Economic Downturn: A ProposedPetroleumFuel
Price Stabilization Plan, 27 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 24 & n. 70 (2009) (noting
increased use of public transit when gasoline prices rose in 2008); Jon Schmitz,
Transit Ridership Declines 4% Nationwide, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Mar. 15,
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Second, minimum parking requirements artificially increase the
distance between housing and jobs, because land used for parking
cannot be used for housing or commerce.' 8 Residents of sprawling,
low-density areas tend to be highly dependent on automobiles for
most daily tasks because they are less likely to live within walking
distance of public transit and other amenities.1 9 Consequently,
minimum parking requirements increase driving, and reduce
economic welfare by depriving people who prefer more compact, less
automobile-oriented neighborhoods from consuming their preferred
bundles of goods and services.
Third, minimum parking requirements discourage walking, by
encouraging landowners to surround their buildings with parking
lots. 20 Where shops and offices are surrounded by a sea of parking,
they are unpleasant places for pedestrians, because pedestrians must
waste time walking through parking lots and risk their lives dodging
automobiles.2 1 When walking is unpleasant, people drive more and
walk less.
Both scholarly and popular commentators claim that Americans
have a love affair with the automobile.22 But even in the United
States, minimum parking requirements increase driving which leads
to more congestion, pollution and greenhouse gas emissions than
would otherwise be the case.
Minimum parking requirements also have negative results that are
not directly related to increased automobile travel. The reduction in
density induced by minimum parking requirements may not
significantly affect development in suburban areas where land for
parking is cheap and plentiful. But in urban neighbourhoods where
every inch of land is already developed, a landowner may not be able
to build as much as he or she would like and still comply with
2010, at Al (reporting that transit ridership climbed in 2008 when gasoline prices
rose, and declined after gasoline prices decreased).
18. See infra Part III.A.2.
19. See infra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
20. See infra Part III.A.3.
21. See infra Part III.A.3.
22. See, e.g., SUSAN SHELLY, THE COMPLETE IDIOT'S GUIDE TO MONEY FOR

TEENS 138 (2001) ("Americans love their cars."); Hope M. Babcock, Assuming
Personal Responsibility for Improving the Environment: Moving Toward a New
Environmental Norm, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 117, 133 (2009) (referring to
"America's love affair with cars").
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minimum parking requirements. Thus, minimum parking
requirements artificially reduce the supply of residences, shops and
offices in older, established neighbourhoods and make newer, stilldeveloping suburban areas more attractive for investments. 23
Finally, this article discusses the likely outcomes of allowing
market forces to dictate parking policy, and suggests alternative
policies less drastic than abolition of minimum parking requirements
which reduce the social costs of such regulations. This article
endorses abolition of minimum parking requirements, but adds that
even milder reforms would reduce the negative externality-like
consequences of minimum parking requirements.
Part II of this article lists the externalities which minimum parking
requirements seek to cure. Part III explains the negative effects of
such requirements. Part IV discusses the likely results of abolition,
and Part V lists alternatives that are less radical than abolition, but
reduce the harm caused by existing regulations.
II. THE EXTERNALITIES ADDRESSED BY MINIMUM PARKING
REQUIREMENTS

Municipalities enact minimum parking requirements in order to
limit two externalities: (1) "cruising" 24 and (2) "spillover parking." 25
Each issue will be addressed in turn.
A. Cruising

Where parking is scarce, drivers may drive around a neighborhood
(or "cruise") in search of the most convenient parking space. 26in
Stroud v. City ofAspen, 27 the Colorado Supreme Court suggested that
drivers cause pollution when they "mov[e] slowly around block after
block seeking a place to park," 28 and that minimum parking
requirements may solve this problem by requiring those "who invite
large numbers of people to their establishments-who in turn clog the
23. See infra Part III.B.
24. See infra Part II.A.
25. See infra Part II.B.
26. See Michael Manville & Donald Shoup, People, Parking and Cities, 25
AcCESS 1, 4 (2004), http://shoup.bol.ucla.edu/People,Parking,Cities.pdf (using
term "cruising" to describe motorists' search for parking).
27. 532 P.2d 720 (Colo. 1975).
28. Id. at 723.
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streets, air and ears of our citizens-to provide parking facilities so that
automobiles may be placed in a stall and stilled." 29
The Stroud court's analysis suggests that the harm caused by
cruising is an externality - that is, when a business fails to build
parking spaces for its customers, the business profits from its refusal
to spend money on parking, but the community as a whole suffers
from the traffic congestion and pollution generated by cruising.30
Minimum parking requirements prevent this externality by requiring
businesses to install parking lots, so that customers can park as
quickly as possible rather than wasting time and gasoline trying to
find parking.
Coase points out that in some situations, government regulation is
not necessary to prevent externalities: the damage-causing business
could, after private negotiations, compensate the victim of its activity,
or the victim could pay the business to stop causing the damage.31
But Coase admits that such a private settlement is unlikely where "a
large number of people are involved and in which therefore the costs
of handling the problem through the market . .. are very high." 3 2
Cruising clearly is such a situation for three reasons. First, the
congestion and pollution caused by cruising may affect many people
near the cruising location; other drivers through congestion, and
pedestrians because they breathe air polluted by cruising vehicles.
Such a large group of people cannot easily be organized to request
compensation. Second, the cruising victims might not even know if
they were being victimized or by whom. Even if cruising victims
knew that traffic congestion was more obnoxious than usual, they
would not be able to identify whose customers had created such
congestion, and thus might be unable to bargain with that business.
Third, some of the victims of cruising might not be alive today, or

29. Id

30. Cf Bern Grush, Shoup Made Visible: Toronto's PricingProblems, PARKING
34, 34-40 (2009), http://shoup.bol.ucla.edu/Toronto%27s
PricingProblems.pdf (showing example of harm caused by cruising in Toronto).
31. See Coase, supra note 3, at 10 (explaining that where such settlement is
cost-free, "the decision of the courts concerning liability for damages would be
without effect on the allocation of resources"). Coase notes that in the latter
situation, even the victim is better off, because her losses from compensating the
damage-causer may be lower than the cost of the damage itself. Id. at 6-8
(supplying hypothetical example).
32. Id. at 18.
TODAY
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might not live in the United States.33 Automobiles are a major emitter
of carbon dioxide ("C02"), 34 a greenhouse gas that may cause
climate change,35 and today's emissions may cause harm for decades

to come.36
B.

Spillover Parking

Another justification for minimum parking requirements is public
concern over "spillover parking;" the possibility that if business A's
customers cannot park in A's parking lot, their cars will "spill over"
into residential neighborhood B, thus depriving B's residents of
parking spaces.37
Spillover parking is also arguably an externality: Business A
benefits from not spending money on parking, but B's residents are
harmed by not being able to park near their homes. Here too,
government regulation may prevent the externality. If A builds a
huge parking lot, its customers will have little reason to travel into B
to park their vehicles.
Additionally, like cruising, spillover parking is unlikely to be
settled through negotiations between the affected parties. Because
residents of a neighborhood do not own public streets near their
houses they have no property right to park on those streets, and
33. See infra notes 34-35.
34. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 524 (2007) (stating that the United
States transportation industry is responsible "for more than 6% of worldwide
carbon dioxide emissions").
35. Id. at 525 (transportation industries' carbon dioxide emissions "make a
meaningful contribution to greenhouse gas concentrations" which, according to
petitioners, may in turn lead to worldwide global warming).
36. See Sarah Krakoff, American Indians, Climate Change, and Ethics for a
Warming World, 85 DENV. U. L. REV. 865, 866 (2008) (stating that CO 2 "stays in
the atmosphere for hundreds of years").
37. See Douglas Laycock, State RFRAs and Land Use Regulation, 32 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 755, 766 (1999) (for example, if a church provides its worshippers
with an insufficient number of parking spaces, the city has an interest in "ensuring
that the spillover from the church parking lot does not deprive neighbors of
reasonable opportunity to park in their own neighborhood"). I note one weakness
in this analysis: B's residents do not own the streets in their neighbourhood, and
thus have no legal right to on-street parking. But even though this reality prevents
B's residents from having a common-law right of action against A, it is unlikely to
prevent government officials dependent on the votes of B's residents from heeding
those residents' complaints.
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accordingly have no bargaining power to negotiate effectively with a
nearby business. Thus, government regulation is likely to address
spillover parking more successfully than private negotiation.
III. NEGATIVE SIDE EFFECTS OF MINIMUM PARKING REQUIREMENTS
Although minimum parking requirements may solve the problems
of cruising and spillover parking, these regulations create their own
negative side effects, including encouraging driving (and thus
increasing pollution and congestion) and discouraging infill
development. 38
A.

Why ParkingRequirements Mean More Driving

As noted above, courts have justified minimum parking
requirements as a way to stop the additional driving that results from
cruising, and the congestion and pollution that result from such
driving. 39 But in fact, minimum parking requirements may actually
increase driving (and thus the congestion and pollution arising from
driving), by (1) reducing the price of parking and thus of driving, (2)
reducing population and employment density, thus making
alternatives to driving less practical, and (3) making streets less
pedestrian-friendly by encouraging businesses to place parking lots in
front of their stores and offices. 4 0
1. The Subsidy Effect
Municipal parking requirements either directly require businesses
and landlords to make parking free to customers, 41 or indirectly cause
free parking by increasing the supply of parking, thus reducing the
38. Infill development "is development that takes place within an area that is
already developed or has been developed previously." DEV., CMTY., & ENV'T DIV.,
UNITED STATES ENVT'L PROTECTION AGENCY, COMPARING METHODOLOGIES TO
ASSESS TRANSPORTATION AND AIR QUALITY: IMPACTS OF BROWNFIELDS AND

INFILL DEVELOPMENT 3 (2001), http://tmip.fhwa.dot.gov/resources/
clearinghouse/docs/EPA-23 1-R-0 1-001/EPA-23 1-R-01-001 .pdf.
39. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text (discussing case law
upholding minimum parking requirements on these grounds).
40. See infra Part III.A.3.

41. See Trip Pollard, Building Greener Communities: Smarter Growth and
Green Building, 27 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 125, 140 (2009) (suggesting that free parking
is sometimes required).
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market price of parking down to zero.42 As a result, ninety-nine
percent of American driving trips end at a destination with free
parking. 43 However, such ostensibly "free" parking arises from a
government-mandated redistribution of wealth from businesses (and
their tenants and customers, and thus from society as a whole) to
motorists. This redistribution also causes more driving than that
which would occur if parking were priced separately rather than
being bundled with the costs of housing and other goods and services
(as is the case when parking is free).
a. Transferring Wealth To Drivers
Minimum parking requirements force landowners to spend money
building parking spaces. Estimates of the cost of parking spaces vary
from about $2,000 per space to as high as $20,000 per space." The
cost of land is the primary factor affecting parking space cost; land
for parking is more expensive in urban locations than in suburbs,
where land tends to be more plentiful.4 5
Where parking is free or very inexpensive, landowners do not pass
the cost of parking space construction to drivers, which means that as
a practical matter, free parking subsidizes driving. Who pays for this
subsidy? At first glance, it might seem that landowners pay, because
they build the parking lots. But to some extent, landowners may pass
the cost of free parking on to all of their customers. For example, a
42. See Richard Wilson, Suburban Parking Requirements: A Tacit Policy For
Automobile Use And Sprawl, 61 J. OF THE AM. PLAN. Ass'N 29, 34 (1995) ("When
developers are required to provide more parking than is demanded, the oversupply
tends to push the market price down to zero.").
43. See RACHEL WEINBERGER, JOHN KAEHNY & MATTHEW RUFO, INST. FOR
TRANSP. & DEV. POL'Y, U.S. PARKING POLICY: AN OVERVIEW OF MANAGEMENT
STRATEGIES 5 (2010), http://www.itdp.org/documents/
ITDP US Parking Report.pdf.
44. See ROBERT CERVERO & DAVID ALAN ASCHAUER, ECONOMIC IMPACT
ANALYSIS OF TRANSIT INVESTMENTS: GUIDEBOOK FOR PRACTITIONERS, 9-17 and
9-18 (1998) (cost of parking space may range from $2,000 to $20,000, depending
on a variety of factors); Roberta F. Mann, On The Road Again: How Tax Policy
Drives Transportation Choice, 24 VA. TAX REV. 587, 636 (2005) ("The cost of
providing a parking space varies from $2,000 in suburban areas to $20,000 in urban
areas.").
45. See TODD LITMAN, VICTORIA TRANsP. POL'Y INST., PARKING
MANAGEMENT: COMPREHENSIVE IMPLEMENTATION GUIDE 18 tbl.7 (2010),
http://www.vtpi.org/park mancomp.pdf.
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landlord might seek to recoup the cost of parking through higher
rents for commercial and residential tenants. In turn, those tenants (if
they are commercial tenants) may pass the costs of those higher rents
to their customers. One study suggests, after consideration of a
variety of direct and indirect costs, that each residential parking space
may increase housing costs in the United States by about $85,000 per
unit.46 Thus, minimum parking requirements function as a kind of
hidden sales tax, increasing the price of goods and services for
everyone. But the benefits of this "sales tax" go primarily to
motorists, 47 and thus subsidize drivers at the expense of non-drivers.
In sum, minimum parking requirements, by increasing residential
rents, commercial rents, and (less directly) the cost of other goods
and services, require society as a whole to subsidize driving.
Furthermore, because poorer Americans drive less than middle- and
upper-class Americans,48 these regulations effectively redistribute
wealth from the poor to the middle and upper classes.

46. See VICTORIA TRANSP. POL'Y INST., TRANSPORTATION COST AND BENEFIT
ANALYSIS II- PARKING COSTS 5.4-19 (2010), http://www.vtpi.org/tca/tca0504.pdf

One study:
estimates that each additional residential parking space effectively
increases typical U.S. urban housing unit costs by $52,000 to $117,000,
with a mid-range value of $85,627. These figures are derived from
observed differences in housing prices, reduced loan eligibility because of
increased car-related household costs, public infrastructure costs
associated with accommodating developments that are more dispersed due
to parking requirements, and direct financial impacts on neighbors of new
developments.
SIMON McDONNELL, JOSIAH MADAR, & VICKI BEEN, FURMAN CTR. FOR REAL EST.
& URB. POL'Y, MINIMUM PARKING REQUIREMENTS, TRANSIT PROXIMITY AND
DEVELOPMENT IN NEW YORK CITY 5 (2010), http://furmancenter.org/files/

publications/ParkingRequirements SubmittedTRBresubmit withref- 1.pdf
(parking adds 10 percent to cost of housing in San Francisco); WEINBERGER et al.,
supra note 43, at 32-33 (listing numerous studies with roughly similar results).
47. Of course, it could be argued that minimum parking requirements actually
benefit non-drivers by reducing cruising and thus reducing pollution. See supra
Part II.A. But if, as suggested below, minimum parking requirements encourage
driving, this argument may fail. See infra Part III.A. 1(b) (showing that free parking
or its absence affects travel patterns).
48. See Babak A. Rastgoufard, Too Much Smoke and Not Enough Mirrors: The
Case Against CigaretteExcise Taxes and For Gasoline Taxes, 36 URB. LAW. 411,
438 n. 140 (2004) ("[A] 10 [percent] increase in household income increases daily
[total vehicle miles traveled] by 3.5-3.7 [percent].") (citation omitted).
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b. The ParkingSubsidy Really Does Increase Driving
Numerous case studies show that free parking in fact increases
automobile use. 49 For example, in 1974, the Canadian government
stopped providing free parking to its employees in Ottawa.o
Although the government still subsidized employee parking, the
subsidy was reduced from 100% of parking cost to thirty percent.
The percentage of employees driving to work alone decreased from
thirty-five percent to twenty-eight percent, and the percent using
public transit increased from forty-two percent to forty-nine

percent. 52
The Ottawa study occurred in a downtown workplace with
ample public transit, 53 but even in automobile-oriented suburban
sites, reductions in parking subsidies affect driver behavior.5 4 For
55
example, in a suburb of Los Angeles with minimal transit service,
an employer raised the price of parking for solo drivers to two-thirds
56
of the market rate.
Before parking rates were increased, ninety
percent of workers drove alone to work, and six percent carpooled.
Afterwards, forty-six percent drove alone, and forty-eight percent
carpooled.5 8 In sum, parking is price-sensitive: free parking means
more driving in general and more solo driving in particular, while
priced parking leads to increased transit use (where public transit is

49. See Richard W. Willson & Donald C. Shoup, ParkingSubsidies and Travel
Choices: Assessing the Evidence, 17 TRANSPORTATION 141, 144-45 (1990) (citing
three examples in Los Angeles).
50. See id. at 148.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 146. This change occurred over a one-year period.
53. Id. (Noting that Ottawa transit "has high ridership levels."). Id. at 149-50
(describing similar results at worksites in and around downtown Los Angeles).
54. See infra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.
55. Willson & Shoup, supra note 49, at 147 (noting that both before and after
parking prices changed, no employees commuted via public transit).
56. Id. Of course, this "market rate" was itself lower than it would have been in
the absence of minimum parking requirements. See supra note 34 and
accompanying text. So the authors' suggestion that commuters were charged
"market rate" overlooks the fact that even motorists charged the market rate are
effectively subsidized as a result of minimum parking requirements.
57. Willson & Shoup, supra note 49, at 146.
58. Id. See also WEINBERGER et al., supra note 43, at 19 (citing numerous other
examples).
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available) and increased carpooling (where public transit is minimal
or nonexistent).
Consequently, by reducing the price of parking, minimum parking
requirements increase the number of cars on American roads, thus
increasing traffic congestion and pollution from cars - ironically,
precisely the ills that such regulations were designed to prevent.5 9 As
noted above, to the extent that minimum parking requirements
increase driving, they also increase greenhouse gas emissions, thus
possibly imposing worldwide costs upon future generations.60
Increased driving may also play a role in non-environmental harms.61
For example, extra driving may lead to increased societal harm from
automobile accidents.6 2 In the United States, automobile collisions
currently kill 40,000-45,000 people per year, and injure 2,000,0003,000,000 more.63
2. Increasing Driving By Reducing Density
Land used for parking lots cannot be used for housing or
commerce, and the extra space required for those parking lots
artificially increases distances between residences, shops, and
offices.64 Thus, minimum parking requirements artificially reduce
population and employment density. For example, in 1961, Oakland,
California required apartment buildings to build one parking space

59. See supra Part II.A.
60. See supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text (describing the relationship
between automobile travel and climate change).
61. See STATE ENVTL RES. CTR., PAY-AS-YOU-DRIVE AUTO INSURANCE,
http://www.serconline.org/payd/fact.html (last updated May 10, 2004) ("Although
mileage is just one of several factors that affect crash rates, a 10% reduction in
driving is expected to reduce crashes by 17%") (citation omitted).
62. See id.
63. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, MOTOR VEHICLE OCCUPANTS AND
NONOCCUPANTS
KILLED AND
INJURED: 1980 To 2007, tbl. 1070,
(last visited
http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2010/tables/1Osl070.pdf
Feb. 20, 2011) (fatalities have fluctuated between 40,000 and 45,000 since 1985,
and injuries have fluctuated between 2 and 3 million since 2000 after reaching
higher levels in earlier decades).
64. See Michael Lewyn, New Urbanist Zoningfor Dummies, 58 ALA. L. REV.
257, 280 (2006).

2010]

PARKING REGULATION

101

per dwelling unit. 65 Within three years of this ordinance, the number
of apartments per acre in Oakland had decreased by thirty percent. 66
This result is probably fairly typical. The average one bedroom
apartment in the United States includes 800 square feet of space. 6 7 if
a landlord has 80,000 square feet of land, and uses all of it for
housing, it can build 100 (80,000/800) apartments. But if the same
landlord has to build a parking space for every unit, it obviously
cannot build 100 apartments. This is because the average parking
space includes 350 square feet of space, 6 8 and the landlord, in turn,
must either purchase additional land, build smaller apartments, or
build only about sixty-nine apartments.69 The above discussion
assumes that parking is placed aboveground. If parking is placed in
underground garages, additional parking spaces would not affect
density. However, garage parking is often more expensive than
aboveground parking, and thus less likely to be installed. 70 Thus, a
one-space-per-unit rule reduces density by thirty-one percent (from
100 apartments to sixty-one apartments on the same land).
As a result, low density makes commuters more dependent on
automobiles. Lower density means that fewer people can live within
walking distance of a given destination. So, if fewer people can live
within convenient walking distance of a bus or train stop, more
people will have to drive to work, and the remaining non-drivers will
71
have longer, less convenient commutes. Similarly, if few people
65. SHOUP, supra note 6, at 143.
66. Id. at 144.
67. See Jim Jordan, To Tell or Not To Tell: That's Noise Question, LEXINGTON
HERALD-LEADER, Dec. 26, 1993, at HI (referring to the "national average rent for a
one-bedroom apartment with 800 square feet of space," thus implying that average
apartment has 800 square feet).
68. See CERVERO, supra note 44, at 3-4.
69. More precisely, the landlord would build somewhere between sixty-nine
and seventy apartments. If the landlord builds sixty-nine apartments, it can devote
55,200 square feet to apartments (sixty-nine x 800) and 24,150 square feet to
parking (sixty-nine x 350) and have 650 square feet left over. On the other hand,
the landlord cannot build seventy of each without purchasing 500 square feet of
additional land, because it must devote 56,000 square feet to apartments (seventy x
800) and 24,500 square feet to parking (seventy x 350).
70. See LIrMAN, supra note 45, at 18 tbl. 7 (comparing the cost of surface
parking with cost of underground parking).
71. See Robert H. Freilich, The Land Use Implications of Transit-Oriented
Development: Controlling the Demand Side of Transportation Congestion and
Urban Sprawl, 30 URB. LAW. 547, 552 n. 18 (1998) (suggesting that people
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live within walking distance of a shop, job, or office, most people
will have to drive to reach such destinations. 72 Hence, by reducing
density, minimum parking requirements make walking and public
transit less convenient, consequently increasing automobile-related
congestion, pollution, and greenhouse gas emissions.7 3
It could be argued that low-density development actually reduces
congestion and the resulting air pollution by artificially dispersing
traffic among a wide variety of destinations. 74 But a recent study
sponsored by the United States Department of Energy suggests that,
on balance, compact, transit-oriented development reduces
pollution. In particular, the study found that doubling residential
density reduces household vehicle miles traveled by five to twelve
percent.76 If increased density was accompanied by improved public
transit and other supportive land use policies, household driving
could be reduced by as much as twenty-five percent.7 7 These
reductions in driving would, in turn, reduce United States greenhouse
gas emissions by eight to eleven percent by 2050.7 Smaller
reductions in driving would lead to more modest reductions in
* - 79

emissions.

Similarly, Harvard economist Edward Glaeser and UCLA
economist Matthew Kahn recently conducted a study finding that
low-density, automobile-oriented regions emitted more greenhouse
gases from transportation than more pedestrian- and transit-oriented

typically will not walk more than a fourth of a mile to the transit station, and that
densities of at least seven units per acre are required for significant transit
ridership).
72. See Lewyn & Cralle, supra note 6, at 616.
73. See supra notes 24, 30 (describing congestion and greenhouse emissions
caused by auto traffic).
74. See Ilya Somin & Jonathan H. Adler, The Green Costs of Kelo: Economic
Development Takings and Environmental Protection, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 623,
657 (2006).
75. See TRANSP. RES. BD., BD. ON ENERGY AND ENVTL. SYs., U.S. NAT'L
RESEARCH COUNCIL, SPEC. REP. No. 298, DRIVING AND THE BUILT ENVIRONMENT
12 (2009), availableat http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?recordid=12747#toc.
76. Id. at 4.
77. Id. at 5, 31-66 (describing the relationship between density and vehicle
miles traveled in more detail).
78. Id. at 7.
79. Id.
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regions.so For example New York City, the region with the highest
use of public transit, emitted 19,524 pounds of C02 per household
from automobiles and transit users combined, the lowest of ten metro
areas studied. 82 By contrast, several lower-density regions emitted
over 25,000 pounds of transportation-related C02 per household.8 3
Moreover, suburbs, which tend to be less compact and more
automobile-oriented than cities,84 have higher transportation-related
C02 emissions than cities.85 For example, New York's suburban
households emitted over 3,800 more pounds of transportation-related
86
CO 2 per household than did city residents.
Thus, it seems that the sort of low-density development encouraged
by minimum parking requirements has increased, rather than reduced,
greenhouse gas emissions. Indeed, such development has not even
succeeded in reducing congestion. For example, in metropolitan
Philadelphia, region-wide density per square mile declined by fortythree percent between 1982 and 2007: from 4,083 people per square

80. See Edward L. Glaeser & Matthew E. Kahn, The Greenness of Cities:
CarbonDioxide Emissions and Urban Development 1 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 14238, 2008), available at http://www.economics.
harvard.edu/faculty/glaeser/files/GreenessGlaeserKahn_2008.pdf; see also
EDWARD L. GLAESER & MATTHEW E. KAHN, THE GREENNESS OF CITIEs 2 (2008),
http://www.drcog.org/documents/greencities final.pdf ("low-density development
... is associated with far more carbon dioxide emissions than higher-density
construction").
81. Id. at 5.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 8.
85. Id. (in every city surveyed, suburbanites generated more automobile-related
emissions, and this "emissions gap" between city and suburb exceeded additional
public transit-related emissions created by city residents).
86. Id. Urbanites were responsible for 2,367 more pounds of public transitrelated emissions per household, but suburbanites responsible for 6,150 more
pounds of driving-related emissions per household. Glaeser and Kahn obtained
similar results for nine other large metropolitan areas: in each, suburbanites were
responsible for more driving-related emissions, and those emissions outweighed
city residents' extra public transit-related emissions. Id. (listing data for Atlanta,
Los Angeles, Chicago, Boston, Philadelphia, Detroit, Washington, Houston, and
San Francisco).
87. See supranotes 71-73 and accompanying text.
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mile to 2,329 people per square mile. Yet traffic congestion,
measured by the number of hours lost to congestion per peak-period
traveler, increased from sixteen hours per traveler in 1982 to thirtyeight in 2007.89 Philadelphia is an extreme case, but not atypical.
Among the United States' largest urban areas, the average regional
density per square mile decreased from 3,296 people per square mile
to 2,820 between 1982 and 2007, while the average number of hours
lost to congestion increased from twenty-one per person to fiftyone. 90 As a result, to the extent minimum parking requirements have
contributed to pedestrian-unfriendly levels of density, they have
increased pollution while failing to reduce congestion.
3. A Degraded Urban Fabric
If landowners are forced to build parking, they will normally place
parking lots in front of, rather than in back of, stores and offices. 9 1
Municipal zoning ordinances often require buildings to be set back
far from a sidewalk or street. 92 Because landowners have to put
something between the street and their buildings, that something
might as well be a parking lot, 93 because customers find it more
convenient to park in front of a store than in back. 94 Conversely,
88. See TEX. TRANsP. INST., 2010 ANNUAL URBAN MOBILITY REPORT,
PERFORMANCE MEASURE SUMMARY - PHILADELPHIA PA-NJ-DE-MD 2-6 (2010),

http://mobility.tamu.edulums/congestiondata/tables/phila.pdf.
89. Id.
90. See TEX. TRANsP. INST., 2010 ANNUAL URBAN MOBILITY REPORT, THE
MOBILITY DATA FOR VERY LARGE AREAS - AVERAGE 1-5 (2010), http://mobility.
tamu.edu/ums/congestion data/tables/vlg-combined.pdf.
91. See supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
92. See Lewyn & Cralle, supra note 6, at 614 n. 9.
93. Cf Chad D. Emerson, Making Main Street Legal Again: The Smartcode
Solution to Sprawl, 71 Mo. L. REV. 637, 645 n. 36 (2006) (under conventional
American zoning codes, "front setbacks must be either a 25-foot grass yard or a
paved parking lot") (citation omitted).
94. Kim Mikus, Out With The Old Malls Getting Some New Looks, CHI. DAILY
HERALD, March 5, 2006, at 1 ("Time-starved customers demand convenience,
which often includes parking in front of the store"). Of course, it could be argued
that in order to cater to customer desires, businesses will supply such parking even
in the absence of minimum parking requirements. But without government
regulation, landowners would weigh this impulse against the cost of land, and
against their desire to build more stores and thus obtain more revenue. Cf infra
note 93 (businesses often either try to evade minimum parking requirements or
build the bare minimum required by law).
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where shops are surrounded by a sea of parking, these shops are
anything but inviting for pedestrians. In such situations, pedestrians
must waste time walking through parking lots, 95 and must risk life
and limb dodging automobiles that are in search of parking spaces. 96
By contrast, where shops and other destinations flank the sidewalk,
pedestrians can reach their destinations quickly and conveniently. 97
If the parking-dominated landscapes created by setback and
minimum parking requirements are time-consuming9 8 and dangerous
for pedestrians, it logically follows that such requirements deter
walking and encourage driving, thus increasing traffic congestion,
pollution, and greenhouse gas emissions. 99
B. Bad For Business
As noted above, minimum parking requirements reduce population
and employment density, 00 which means that they reduce the number
of dwellings and businesses that can be built in a given area. This
result might not significantly reduce economic development in rural
and developing suburban areas, where land for parking is cheap and

95. See Lewyn & Cralle, supra note 6, at 615. I note that such parking lots may
be especially unpleasant in warm climates, because parking lots often lack trees and
reflect heat. See Editorial, A Lightning Rod For Controlling Growth, ATLANTA J. &
CONSTIT., May 5, 2000, at A22 (describing parking lots as "giant heat islands" and
stating that parking lots "can heat up to 120 degrees Fahrenheit when the air
temperature hits 80 degrees" based on NASA satellite data); Editorial, Patches of
Shade Don't Cut it in Valley, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Sept. 2, 2005, at 2 (describing the
temperature in one asphalt lot as measuring 155 degrees in the sun, and 103 degrees
in shade); Nancy Samoff, Project is Good to Go, Hous. CHRONICLE, Aug. 18,
2004, at 1 (describing Houston's roads as "blighted" with "treeless parking lots").
96. See Editorial,Patches ofShade Don't Cut it in Valley, supra note 95.
97. See Douglas G. French, Cities Without Soul: Standardsfor Architectural
Controls with Growth Management Objectives, 71 U. DET. MERCY L. REv. 267,
280 (1994) (suggesting that pedestrians find such places more aesthetically
appealing because "small setbacks and shopfront windows provide more interesting
scenery for pedestrians and create a feeling of connection between the buildings
and the public spaces bordering them").
98. See supra note 64 (noting that parking lots artificially increase distances
between residences, shops and offices). Pedestrians, therefore, waste time walking
through parking lots.
99. See supra note 30 (describing congestion and greenhouse emissions caused
by auto traffic).
100. See supra PartIII.A.2.
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plentiful;'o' a landowner who wants to build a shopping center or a
business in a rural area can easily buy a little more undeveloped land
to make up for land eaten up by parking. But in already-developed
areas, a landowner may be hemmed in by other landowners, and thus
be unable to build housing or businesses while complying with
minimum parking requirements.
For example, in Milburn Courtyard Assocs. v. Planning Bd. of
Twp. of Milburn,102 an entrepreneur proposed to establish a restaurant
in a downtown' 03 district which (according to the city's official plan)
"has emphasis on pedestrian scale retail business." 04 The applicant's
site contained only one parking spot, but the city's minimum parking
regulations required the applicant to build twelve parking spots, even
though the downtown district contained numerous public parking
lots. 0 5 A New Jersey court held that the restaurant could not be
established without a zoning variance. 106 Thus (assuming no
variance was granted), the would-be restauranteur would have had to
purchase enough land for a dozen parking spots- a task that might be
more difficult in a downtown area than in a more suburban area with
more undeveloped land.
Even where a business can find enough land to build parking lots
or garages in cities, such land is more expensive than in suburbia.107
A typical downtown surface parking lot costs $2,035 per space, per
year, while a comparable suburban parking lot costs $432 per
space/year; 1os primarily because of higher land costs.109 A business

101. See Mann, supra note 44, at 635 (asserting that parking spaces are more
expensive to build in cities than in suburbs).
102. 2006 WL 1413698 (N.J. Super. May 23, 2006).
103. Id. at *1-2 (describing application, and noting that neighbourhood was
zoned "Downtown Center").
104. Id. at *4.
105. Id. at *2.
106. Id. at *15. It is unknown whether a variance was ultimately granted. Even
if a variance had been granted, the cost of litigation and of the landowner's quest
for a variance might have made his attempt to comply with parking requirements
more expensive than it would have been had he built his restaurant in a suburb with
cheap, abundant land.
107. See Mann, supra note 44 and accompanying text.
108. See LITMAN, supra note 45, at 18 tbl. 7.
109. Id. (explaining that suburban land costs $455 per space, while downtown
land costs $15,385 per space). Non-downtown urban land typically costs more than
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can avoid high land costs by building parking spaces underground;
however, savings from land costs are often outweighed by the added
expense of building an underground parking structure. 0
Thus, compliance with minimum parking requirements is both
more difficult and more expensive for urban businesses than for
suburban businesses. As a result, such regulations encourage wouldbe builders to move from built-out urban areas to developing areas
with a more abundant supply of land."' This parking-induced
redistribution of resources to suburbia creates an externality-like
harm for older areas (which lose business as a result of parking
requirements), and for would-be developers who are forced to move
from their first-choice locations to cheaper and/or more suburban
locations.
C. Do Regulations Matter?

The above analysis assumes a causal relationship between
municipal minimum parking requirements and widespread cheap
parking. Although, it could be argued that parking is so desirable that
even in the absence of government regulation, businesses would
provide as much free parking as they do today." 2
However, as a matter of logic, this argument proves too much. If
parking is so desirable that businesses would provide free parking in
the absence of a legal requirement, why are legal requirements
necessary to force businesses to provide adequate parking? Indeed,

suburban land but less than downtown land. Id. (providing an example of nondowntown urban surface parking costs which are $2,083 per space).
110. Id. A downtown surface parking lot costs just over $15,000 for land and
$3,000 for construction, while a similarly located underground garage costs nothing
for land and $25,000 for construction; similarly, suburban two-level garage costs
nothing for land but $10,000 for construction, several times the cost of a suburban
surface parking lot. Id.
111. I note that in addition to preventing the formation of new businesses in
already-developed areas, minimum parking requirements may also prevent
expansion of existing businesses. See, e.g., Scampoli v. Zoning Bd. of Rev. of
Town of N. Providence, No. Civ. A. PC 04-240,1, 2005 WL 1433736 (R.I. Super.
June 16, 2005) (barring expansion of existing medical office due to parking
requirements).
112. Cf Craig N. Oren, Getting Commuters Out Of Their Cars: What Went
Wrong?, 17 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 141, 168 n. 169 (1998) (suggesting that free parking
major factor in drawing tenants to office buildings).
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courts' emphasis on externalities such as cruising" 3 suggest that even
supporters of minimum parking requirements know that those rules
cannot be justified based on the interests on the businesses forced to
provide parking. Moreover, the existence of litigation surrounding
minimum parking requirements11 4 suggests that landowners are
sometimes willing to forego additional parking."t5 So even though it
is unknown exactly to what extent a more market-oriented parking
policy would reduce the amount of free or almost-free parking
spaces, the correct answer certainly exceeds zero.

IV. To ABOLISH OR NOT To ABOLISH?
As noted above, minimum parking requirements create a benefit
for drivers who use parking lots," 6 and may benefit people faced
with less cruising and spillover parking near their residences.
However, by increasing the amount of free (or nearly free) parking,
such regulations also create negative side effects, increasing driving
and its ill effects while burdening cities to a greater extent than
suburbs, thus making cities less competitive." 7 Thus, one question
facing local policymakers is: on balance, would the abolition of
minimum parking requirements increase or decrease these harms?
The pros and cons of abolition might differ in suburban and urban
locations.
A. In Suburbia

Elimination of minimum parking requirements does not mean
elimination of parking. Rather, parking deregulation still allows

113. See supra Part II.A.
114. See supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text (describing one case); cf
Martha Groves, Phantom Parking on the Westside, L. A. TIMES, June 20, 2007, at
B 1 (discussing Los Angeles businesses' attempts to evade requirements).
115. WEINBERGER et al., supra note 43, at 30 (explaining that businesses rarely
build more parking spaces than required by law).
116. See supra notes 23-25, 32-35 and accompanying text (describing cruising
and spillover parking problems, and noting that parking regulations often cause
parking to be free for motorists).
117. See supra Part III.A (showing how minimum parking requirements increase
driving), 1II.B (showing how minimum parking requirements are more burdensome
in urban areas).
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landowners to install as much parking as they wish." 8 Abolition of
minimum parking requirements is likely to have little impact in lowdensity, automobile-dependent suburbs that have an abundance of
cheap land. In such areas, businesses are motivated to build at least
some parking (since most visitors to such suburbs would arrive by
car), while the costs of parking lot construction are less onerous than
in an urban setting.' 19
Nevertheless, some landowners might build fewer parking spaces
than they do today in order to get more housing or businesses on their
land and thus more revenue therefrom. At most worksites, the amount
of available free parking exceeds consumer demand.120 Thus, a
landowner could satisfy customers' desire for free parking while
reducing the amount of parking spaces.
If such a reduction in parking spaces occurred, some (but not
all) of the negative results of minimum parking requirements would
be reduced. Most suburbanites would continue to drive to most
destinations, but the number of unnecessary parking spaces, and thus
their costs to businesses and society, would modestly decline.
Pedestrians would still have to walk through a sea of parking to reach
shops, offices, and apartments- but those seas might be a little
smaller and less dangerous.
Moreover, the primary arguments in favor of minimum parking
requirements, concerns over spillover parking and cruising, do not
apply in a suburban setting. In the most automobile-dependent
118. Installing parking may be limited only by maximum parking regulations.
Portland and Cambridge are among the cities which have observed the need to find
a "comfort zone" with regard to parking regulations. See ADAM MILLARD-BALL,
AM. PLANNING Ass'N, PUTTING ON THEIR PARKING CAPS 2 (2002),

http://www.stanford.edu/~adammb/Publications/Millard-Ball_2002_Putting
onTheir _ParkingCaps.pdf.
119. See CERVERO, supra note 44 and accompanying text (explaining that land is
generally cheaper and easier to acquire in suburbs).
120. See SHOUP, supra note 6, at 31-32, 81 (suggesting that minimum parking
requirements tend to be far too restrictive because they are based on Institute for
Transportation Engineers estimates, which are based on data from heavily cardependent neighbourhoods during the times of year with the heaviest traffic, as
opposed to data from urban settings or routine daily demand); J. RICHARD
KUZMYAK ET AL.,TRANSP. RES. BD., TCRP REPORT 95PARKING MANAGEMENT

AND SUPPLY 18-8-10 (2003), http://onlinepubs.trb.org/onlinepubs/tcrp/tcrp
rpt_95cl8.pdf (citing numerous examples of places where municipal regulations
required more parking than was in fact used by motorists).
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suburban environments, population densities are low and land uses
are highly segregated. 12 1 Thus, a motorist who wished to engage in
spillover parking (by parking on a residential street and then walking
to a nearby business) would have to be willing to take a long walk to
her destination- not an appealing prospect to most drivers the
majority of the time. 122 Cruising for cheap on-street parking is
equally unlikely in a suburban setting, because most suburban
parking is usually free and off-street.123
Consequently, in a suburban setting, there is no reason not to
abolish minimum parking requirements. Landowners would benefit
slightly from not being required to build additional parking spaces,
their neighbors suffer almost no negative effects, consumers save
money as the cost of parking would be incorporated in the cost of
goods and services, and pedestrians enjoy walking-friendly
environments. Thus, minimum parking requirements in suburban
settings should be abolished: they may not cause very much harm,
but they also prevent almost no harm.
B. Cities
In urban settings with scarce or expensive land, landowners have a
strong incentive to eliminate off-street parking in the absence of
bureaucratic regulation, because the cost of land (and thus of parking
space construction) is often higher in cities. 124 Thus, the positive
impact of parking deregulation might be greater in urban locations:
more land would be freed up for development. Additionally,
population density would increase, causing walking and public transit
121. See John M. Barry, Form-Based Codes: Measured Success Through Both
Mandatory and Optional Implementation , 41 CONN. L. REv. 305, 305 (2009)
(explaining how "[c]onventional zoning has encouraged suburban sprawl through
its promotion of low density and single use development").
122. See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text (explaining why low density
discourages walking).
123. See supra note 43 and accompanying text (describing how most North
American parking is free); Don Ahern, Latimer Says City Shortchanged on Road
Funds, ST. PAUL PIONEER-PRESS, July 27, 1989, at Al0, (reporting that in St. Paul,
Minnesota, "suburbs, unlike the city, have ample off-street parking"); Melissa
Giamo, Zoning Into A New D.C., ROLL CALL, July 28, 2008, available at 2008
WLNR 14053876 (describing how in the 1950s, urban planners required off-street
parking in order "to make cities more like suburbs").
124. See Mann, supra note 44, at 635 (suggesting that construction of parking
spaces is less expensive in suburbs).
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use to become less uncomfortable.125 As a result, the positive results
of parking deregulation might be greater in cities and older suburbs
than in the newest, least-developed suburbs.
On the other hand, the traditional arguments for minimum parking
requirements may be stronger in more urban, walkable areas than in
suburbia. In the absence of minimum parking requirements, spillover
parking might increase, because a motorist is more likely to walk
from a residential street to a commercial street in an urban setting
than in a suburban setting, where huge parking lots and wide streets
make walking less feasible.' 2 6 In addition, because on-street parking
is more common in urban areas,127 more motorists might cruise in
search of on-street parking spaces rather than driving into a parking
lot.128 Thus, abolition of minimum parking requirements might, other
things being equal, increase the negative externalities of cruising and
of spillover parking. 12 9
Given the wide variety of factors affecting a region's levels of
vehicle-induced pollution it cannot be stated with absolute certainty
that minimum parking requirements' harmful environmental effects
outweigh the positive environmental results of reduced cruising. But
as noted above, numerous studies have suggested that more compact,
transit-oriented development reduces greenhouse gas emissions.130
Given that car-dependent places seem to pollute more than less cardependent places,1 ' it seems likely that on balance minimum parking
requirements, by subsidizing driving and discouraging walking,
125. See supra cite to notes 51-58 and accompanying text (showing that (a)
minimum parking requirements reduce density and (b) lower density in turn
reduces walking and public transit usage).
126. See Jessica Jay, The "Malling" Of Vermont: Can the "Growth Center"
Designation Save the Traditional Village From Suburban Sprawl?, 21 VT. L. REv.
929, 941 (1997) (discussing anti-pedestrian aspects of suburban street design); Jeff
Gray, Police Blaming Accident Victims, PedestrianSays, GLOBE & MAIL, Mar. 15,
2004, at A8, (stating that in suburban Toronto there is "trouble for pedestrians"
because of street design).
127. Cf Bob Vrbanac, Developer Has Big Plans for Former Canbar Lands,
WATERLOO CHRON., Apr. 12, 2006, at 3 (referring to "urban streetscape ... with on-

street parking").
128. See supra notes 24, 26 (defining problem of "cruising").
129. I note, however, that minimum parking requirements are not the only way to
control spillover parking and cruising. See infra Part V.
130. See supranotes 75-79 and accompanying text.
131. See supranotes 34-36 and accompanying text.
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increase the very environmental harms they seek to prevent. Thus, it
seems that there is a strong, though not irrefutable, case for abolition
of minimum parking requirements in cities as well as suburbs.
Because Americans are so car-dependent and thus will need
parking places for the foreseeable future, it could be argued that
minimum parking requirements should not be abolished until public
transit is improved. This argument lacks merit for two reasons. First,
if, as suggested above, minimum parking requirements are
environmentally harmful, society is better off if such regulations are
abolished- even if no other policies are changed.132 Second, the
existence of minimum parking requirements reduces the likelihood
that public transit will ever be improved.133
By making driving artificially cheaper, cities more spread out, and
walking more difficult,134 minimum parking requirements make
public transit (which inevitably involves walking to and from transit
stops) less popular, thus reducing the stream of revenue available for
transit improvements.1 35 Therefore, if a city wants to improve public
transit, it should be especially motivated to reduce minimum parking
requirements. It could also be argued that abolition is simply too
radical to be introduced immediately, and would somehow be too
disruptive to drivers' lives.
This argument is meritless because abolishing minimum parking
requirements is not the same as abolishing parking. Businesses that
have already invested money in parking lots may wish to retain some
parking in order to retain motorist patrons. 136 So any deregulationinduced reduction in the parking supply may be fairly gradual.
Moreover, some cities are already experimenting with parking
reforms have exhibited little evidence of disruption. For example,
Huntsville, Alabama is one of the most automobile-dependent cities
in the United States.1 37 In Huntsville, roughly 0.5% of all commuters
132. For the same reason, it makes little sense to delay abolition until alternatives
such as parking permit systems for residential parking and market pricing for onstreet parking are introduced. See infra Part V.B-C (describing these reforms).
133. This assumes that public transit would be improved if it was more utilized.
134. See supra Part III.A.
135. Cf Schmitz, supra note 17 (noting that recession-induced budget gaps
might lead to transit service reductions).
136. See supra note 94 and accompanying text (noting that motorists find it
convenient to park in front of stores).
137. See Lewyn, supra note 64.
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use public transit, 138 fewer than all but ten of the 245 American cities
with over 100,000 people.' 39 Yet Huntsville has abolished minimum
parking requirements in the downtown area1 40 (although not in other
neighborhoods).141 Huntsville appears to have suffered no obvious
harm from its policies; in fact, the downtown population has grown
since 1990.142 Numerous larger cities (such as Seattle, San Francisco,
Portland and Miami) have abolished minimum parking requirements
for their downtown areas over the past decade.143 Although some of
these cities reformed their parking policies so recently that it is
difficult to ascertain the overall effect of their parking reforms,
downtown populations appear to be growing in all four cities. 144
V. ALTERNATIVES To ABOLITION
Some cities have sought to minimize the harm caused by minimum
parking requirements by: (1) imposing fees upon landowners in lieu
of minimum parking requirements, (2) reforming the pricing system
for on-street public parking, (3) using a permit system to ration
138. See id.
139. See id.
140. See Steve Doyle, Planning Commission Approves Bicycle Parking
Ordinance,HUNTSVILLE TIMES, June 23, 2010, at 4A.
141. See Lewyn, supra note 64, at 278-79 (describing Huntsville regulations).
142. See Kay Campbell, Churches are Growing in Fresh Directions,
HUNTSVILLE TIMES, Apr. 20, 2008, at 20S, (indicating downtown Huntsville saw
"population growth of 8.7 percent since 1990..."). In fact, some cities are even
imposing maximum parking requirements for certain districts. See WEINBERGER et
al., supranote 43, at 43, 51, 65 (describing examples).
143. See Linda Baker, No Parking: Condos Leave Out Cars, N. Y. TIMES, Nov.
12, 2006, at 12 (noting Portland revoked minimum parking requirements for its
downtown in 2000 and San Francisco followed suit in 2006); Jennifer Langston,
City Spaces Could Become Scarce, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Apr. 29, 2006,
at Al (indicating that Seattle has no minimum parking requirements for its
downtown); Andres Viglucci, Condo has Space- But Notfor Cars, MIAMI HERALD,
Aug. 18, 2007, at BI (Miami lifted parking requirements for downtown in 2003,
and downtown housing boom followed).
144. See Baker, supra note 143 (describing growth in downtown San Francisco);
Viglucci, supra note 143 (describing downtown Miami construction boom);
BROOKINGS INST. CTR. ON URBAN & METRO. POLICY & FANNIE MAE FOUND., A
RISE IN DOwNTOwN LIVING 1 (1998), http://www.brookings.edu/es/urban/

top2lfin.pdf (noting 1998-2010 downtown population increases of 42% in
Portland, 120% in Seattle, and 95% in Miami). However, these increases are part
of a national trend. Id. (noting similar increases in other cities).
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parking in residential neighbourhoods, and (4) reducing, rather than
eliminating, parking requirements.1 4 5
The advantages and
disadvantages of each alternative will be addressed below.
A. "In Lieu Of Parking" Fees
Some cities allow landowners to avoid minimum parking
requirements by paying "in lieu of parking" fees.1 46 Under this
system, local governments charge just enough for parking to ensure
that a fixed percentage of spaces (for example, fifteen percent) is
always vacant, thus eliminating the incentive for cruising. 1' If these
public facilities are adequate to meet motorist demand for parking,
there is no danger of spillover parking or cruising. Additionally,
because not every store or office would be surrounded by parking,
most businesses would be in front of sidewalks, thus creating more
welcoming environments for pedestrians.
This system would be most practical in compact neighborhoods
where motorists can easily walk from a public parking lot to a shop
or office, as opposed to lower-density environments where no office
is within a short walk of any other. However, such a parking fee
system retains some of the negative side effects of minimum parking
requirements: motorists might still be able to park for free (or at a
less-than-market rate) at the landowners' expense, which means that
landowners would effectively be forced to subsidize driving and its
negative externalities. In sum, "in lieu of parking" fees are a modest
improvement upon the status quo, eliminating some, but not all, of
the negative side effects of minimum parking requirements.
B. Market Pricing
City governments can deter cruising by charging market prices for
on-street parking. Under this system, local governments charge just
enough for parking to eliminate parking shortages 4 8 - that is, enough
145. See LITMAN, supra note 45, at 53 (describing market-priced parking in
Pasadena, Ca.); see id. at 58, 63 (describing numerous cites' reduction of parking
standards); see id. at 59 (describing numerous cities' "fee in lieu" programs); see
id. at 65 (describing "parking permit" system of Arlington, Va.).
146. See SHOUP, supra note 6, at 229.
147. See LITMAN, supra note 45, at 62 (noting that Ventura, Ca. plans to set
parking prices designed to target fifteen percent vacancy rate).
148. See SHOUP, supra note 6, at 296-303 (describing proposal in detail).
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so that some (but not all) parking spaces would be vacant, thus
eliminating the incentive for cruising.
This system has some of the advantages of abolition. For example,
a market pricing system reduces the amount of free parking, thus
reducing the subsidy to drivers caused by minimum parking
requirements. 149 Moreover, the market pricing system and abolition
are not mutually exclusive; a city could deregulate off-street parking,
but institute market pricing to create a guaranteed minimum amount
of on-street parking for motorists.
The market pricing system would also apply only to urban areas
with ample on-street parking. In most suburban commercial areas,
parking is typically off-street, 150 and market pricing would be
irrelevant. Indeed, it could be argued that by eliminating free in-town
on-street parking, a market pricing scheme might make cities less
desirable to visit than suburbs, driving shoppers to suburban sites
with free parking. 5 1 Given this risk, the abolition of minimum
parking requirements should not be made dependent on pricing
reform.
C. Permit Parking

Some cities have instituted parking permit districts in which
parking in certain residential areas is limited to neighborhood
residents.1 52 This system, if adequately enforced, eliminates spillover
parking, one of the major justifications for minimum parking
requirements.1 53 However, permit parking districts are not a cure-all;
149. See supra Part III.A. 1 (explaining how minimum parking requirements
subsidize driving).
150. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
151. A leading proponent of market pricing, Donald Shoup, argues that if parking
fees were used to finance improvements, such as street trees and street furniture,
urban areas would be so desirable as to be competitive with suburbs. See SHOUP,
supra note 6, at 403-27 (citing examples). However, the most successful
experiments with market pricing were in growing, prosperous areas that were so
desirable that people would have shopped there despite high parking fees. See
Lewyn & Cralle, supra note 6, at 624-25 (providing support). It is not yet clear
how well market pricing would work in a less prosperous, desirable business
district.
152. See Cnty. Bd. Of Arlington v. Richards, 434 U.S. 5, 7 (1977) (upholding
such a system).
153. See supra Part II.B (explaining spillover parking and how minimum parking
requirements might eliminate problem).
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by definition they are limited to residential streets, and thus do not
solve the parking problems of commercial streets.154
D. Halfway Measures

A fourth alternative is to reduce, rather than eliminate, minimum
parking requirements. Cities have employed this strategy in areas
where people might drive less frequently than in a typical suburb,
such as neighborhoods near transit stations,15 5 affordable and seniororiented housing developments whose residents are less likely to own
cars,156 or places where customers and employees of multiple
landowners might be able to share parking. 15 7 Given the defects of
minimum parking requirements enumerated above, more lenient
regulations are probably an improvement to the status quo.
Nevertheless, lenient regulations still share the same defects as strict
regulations: an ordinance that requires one parking space per
apartment artificially subsidizes driving,1 58 reduces density, 159 and
discourages economic developmentl 60 - albeit only half as much as
an ordinance that requires two parking spaces per apartment.
Moreover, even a lenient ordinance makes sense only if planners
can accurately guess how much parking a business "needs"- a
questionable assumption, because existing requirements may well be
based on erroneous predictions.' 61

154. See LITMAN, supra note 45, at 20; see also WEINBERGER et al., supra note
43, at 8-9.
155. See LITMAN, supra note 45, at 58 (citing numerous examples).
156. See WEINBERGER et al., supra note 43, at 45 (listing examples).
157. Id. at 46, 54 (providing examples).
158. See supra Part II.A.1.
159. See supra Part III.A.2.
160. See supra Part III.B.
161. See SHOUP, supra note 120 (explaining that existing rules often overestimate
amount of necessary parking) Cf KUZMYAK ET AL., supra note 120 (existing
regulations tend to overstate parking demand); M. Todd Henderson, Justin Wolfers,
& Eric Zitzewitz, Predicting Crime, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 15, 20 n. 12 (2010) ("[N]o
central authority, be it the Soviet Gosplan or the Chicago Police Department, can
aggregate and process all of the information relevant to deciding how to solve a
complex issue, like how much bread or how many police officers are needed in a
city at a particular time and location.") For the same reason, it might be unwise for
governments to enact maximum parking requirements, as some cities have done for
certain neighbourhoods. See WEINBERGER et al., supra note 43, at 43, 51, 65
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Even if today's planners strike the right balance between
discouraging cruising and avoiding parking regulations' negative
effects, the political process may not be flexible enough to allow
planners to change that balance to the appropriate level.
Minimum parking requirements have survived in part because of
NIMBY ("not in my back yard") sentiment. 162 If developers or
government officials propose to ease minimum parking requirements
in a neighborhood, residents of nearby neighborhoods often support
the status quo because of fears of spillover parking.1 63 Hence, if
tomorrow's regulators decide that today's reforms do not go far
enough, they will likely face a NIMBY resistance. However, if the
government stops dictating how much parking landowners build,
there will be no more parking requirements for NIMBYs to protect.
VI. CONCLUSION
North American cities have enacted minimum parking
requirements in order to prevent landowners and motorists from
imposing the externalities of cruising and spillover parking upon the
citizenry as a whole. However, these regulations have created their
own externality-like side effects. By artificially increasing the supply
of parking and thus making driving cheaper and more convenient,
these regulations have redistributed wealth from society as a whole to
drivers, making driving more attractive and thus increasing
automobile travel and its negative externalities (such as pollution,
traffic congestion, and greenhouse gas emissions). By creating the
parking-dominated "strip mall" landscape of suburbia, such
regulations impose discomfort and even danger upon pedestrians.
Additionally, by making urban redevelopment more expensive,
(citing examples in various cities). However, a more detailed discussion of
maximum requirements is beyond the scope of this paper.
162. See Eric Walter, Will Rochester Zoning Changes Spur Development?,
DAILY REC., June 10, 2010, available at 2010 WLNR 12375517 (reporting that in
Rochester, New York, city planners proposed less rigid minimum parking
requirements; residents of area near University of Rochester opposed change
because of concern about "excess on-street parking" by University students and
employees); see also Langston, supra note 143 ("[S]ome neighborhood advocates
argue that developers looking to make a quick buck will skimp on expensive
parking spots, forcing more people to park on already crowded residential
streets.").
163. See Langston, supra note 143.
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minimum parking regulations shift development from city to
As a result, minimum parking
automobile-dependent suburb.
requirements may be one of the situations foreseen by Coase, in
which government regulation creates more congestion and
environmental damage than it prevents.

